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Abstract. In general, most elections follow the principle of equality, or
as it came to be known, the principle of “one man – one vote”. However,
this principle might pose difficulties for voters, who are not well informed
regarding the particular matter that is voted on. In order to address this
issue, a new form of voting has been proposed, namely proxy voting. In
proxy voting, each voter has the possibility to delegate her voting right
to another voter, so called proxy, that she considers a trusted expert on
the matter. In this paper we propose an end-to-end verifiable Internet
voting scheme, which to the best of our knowledge is the first scheme to
address voter coercion in the proxy voting setting.
1 Introduction
Democratic elections represent an important value in many modern states. This
is not limited to governments, also companies and other organizations are con-
stituted in democratic elections. In general, most democratic elections follow the
principle of equal elections, meaning that one person’s vote should be worth as
much as another’s, i.e. one man – one vote [14]. However, this principle often
represents a challenge to voters, who are not sufficiently informed regarding the
particular matter that is voted on. In order to address this issue, a new form
of voting has been proposed, the so called proxy voting. In proxy voting, each
eligible voter has the possibility to delegate her voting right to another eligible
voter, so called proxy, that she considers a trusted expert on the matter.
There already exist few proxy voting implementations, provided by differ-
ent organizations. Two widely known implementations are LiquidFeedback3 and
Adhocracy4. Further proxy voting proposals are the approaches proposed in [19]
and [21].
However, all existing proxy voting proposals fail to address the issue of voter
coercion: namely, the case when the adversary threatens the voter to vote in a
particular way, or to abstain from voting. This issue has been commonly con-
sidered for non-proxy Internet voting, and a number of Internet voting schemes
have been proposed, that address the problem of coercion, e.g. by providing co-
ercion resistance [12] or coercion evidence [8]. In this paper, we build upon [6,12]
3 http://liquidfeedback.org/, last accessed January, 7, 2016.
4 https://adhocracy.de/, last accessed January, 7, 2016.
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and an extension proposed by Spycher et al. [18] to propose a coercion resistant
end-to-end verifiable Internet proxy voting scheme.
This paper is structured as follows: In section 2 we identify and derive se-
curity requirements that are relevant for proxy voting. Section 3 introduces the
fundamentals used for our proposal, which we present in section 4. In section 5
we evaluate the security of our proposal with respect to the requirements. Section
6 summarizes our contributions and provides directions for future research.
2 Requirements for Proxy Voting
The following functional requirements should be provided by a proxy voting
system:
Delegation cancellation. If the voter for any reasons decides to vote herself, she
should be able to cancel the delegation at any point of time before the tallying.
Delegation back-up. The voter can assign up to T priorities to her proxies. Only
the vote from the proxy having highest priority will be included in the vote
count. This functionality is useful if the voter wants to have a “back-up” dele-
gation, in case her first choice of a proxy abstains from the election.
The security requirements in Internet voting have been thoroughly investi-
gated in the literature, and both formal [7] and informal [13,16] definitions have
been proposed. In this work, we aim to address the following security require-
ments for the election.
Vote integrity. All votes cast by eligible voters should be included in the result.
Availability. It should be possible to compute election result even if some of the
involved entities are faulty.
Vote secrecy for voters. The adversary should not be able to learn how a voter
has voted.
We aim at achieving the following security requirements for the delegation pro-
cess:
Delegation integrity. Only the proxy having a valid permit from the voter should
be able to cast a vote on this voter’s behalf. The proxy should not be able to
alter the priority given to them by the voter.
Delegation availability. A proxy should not be selectively prevented from having
the votes delegated to her.
Vote secrecy for proxies. The adversary should not be able to learn how a proxy
has voted.
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Delegation privacy. There should not be a link between a voter’s identity and
her selected proxy. Furthermore, it should not be possible to reveal whether a
voter has delegated a vote or cast it herself.
Delegation unprovability. The proxy should not be able to prove to anyone how
many votes have been delegated to her. Moreover, the proxy can not gain any
knowledge about the actual number the incoming delegations.
Note, that as we want to ensure coercion resistance, we require that vote se-
crecy for both voters and proxies should be ensured also for the case when the
adversary is capable of communicating with the voter or proxy.
3 Background
In this section we introduce the fundamentals used to design our coercion-
resistant verifiable proxy voting scheme.
3.1 Cryptographic Primitives
In the following we describe the cryptographic primitives our scheme relies on.
Hereby, Gq denotes a cyclic multiplicative group with order q and Zq denotes
the cyclic additive group of integers modulo q.
Zero-knowledge proofs. In order to prove the correctness of statements within
the voting scheme without revealing anything beyond the correctness zero-know-
ledge proofs are employed. For this sake, techniques such as proving the knowledge
of discrete logarithm [17] or discrete logarithm equality [5] are being used. These
proofs can be made non-interactive by employing the strong version of the Fiat-
Shamir heuristic suggested in [3]. An important extension of such proofs are
designated-verifier proofs described in [11]. Given the verifier’s public key, these
proofs convince only the designated verifier about the correctness, rather than
the general public.
Linear Encryption. In some parts of our scheme, we use a modified encryption
scheme suggested in [4] (further denoted as LE-ElGamal). This scheme is se-
mantically secure under the DLIN assumption which is implied in groups where
the DDH assumption holds. Namely, let pk = (g1, g2, h) ∈ G3q be the public keys
of the encryption and (x1, x2) ∈ Zq ×Zq the private keys with gx11 = g
x2
2 = h. If
the keys are jointly generated by multiple parties with x1, x2 as threshold-shared
secrets, then, according to [2] at least 2/3 of the parties have to be honest.
The message m ∈ Gq is encrypted as follows: two random values (r1, r2) ∈
Zq × Zq are chosen and then the encryption - denoted as {{m}}pk ∈ G3q - is




2 ,m · hr1+r2). The decryption then proceeds
as m = c3 · c−x11 · c
−x2
2 . Ciphertexts can then be reencrypted by multiplying
a ciphertext by an encryption of 1 using a random value (r′1, r
′
2) ∈ Zq × Zq.
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Further operations used together with the ElGamal encryption, such as mix net
shuffle, well-formedness proofs and plaintext equivalence tests can be adjusted
for LE-ElGamal as well.
Plaintext Equivalence Tests. In order to check whether a given ciphertext c
encrypts the same plaintext as another ciphertext c′ without revealing any addi-
tional information about plaintexts, plaintext-equivalence tests [10] can be em-
ployed. This can be performed by the holders of an encryption secret key and
consists of jointly decrypting the value (c/c′)r given a secretly shared random
value r ∈ Zq which results in 1 in case the plaintexts are equal or in random
value otherwise.
Proxy Reencryption. Let {m}pk1 be a ciphertext encrypting message m with
ElGamal public key pk1 = (g1, h1). Given the knowledge of corresponding secret
key x1 = logg1 h1 which can also be a shared secret between several participants
the method described in [9] allows for computing a new ciphertext {m}pk2 , that
encrypts the same message using a different ElGamal public key pk2.
Mix nets. Important components in electronic voting systems are mix net schemes
which are used for anonymizing lists of ciphertexts e1, ..., eN . In addition to en-
sure the integrity of the shuffle a number of zero-knowledge proofs have been
proposed in the literature. The most efficient schemes - up to now - are pre-
sented in [20] and [1]. A modification of such proofs can be used to mix tuples
of ciphertexts (ē1, ..., ēN ) with ēi = (ei,1, ..., ei,k) while preserving the ordering
within the tuple.
3.2 JCJ/Civitas Scheme
For our goal to provide a scheme for coercion resistant proxy voting we chose the
JCJ/Civitas voting scheme proposed in [12] and then extended and implemented
in [6] as basis. The coercion resistance of the scheme is based on the application
of voting credentials. These credentials are used to authorize votes from eligible
voters. In case a coercer demands the credential from a voter she can simply
provide a fake credential which could not be distinguished from the real one by
the coercer. We briefly outline the scheme below.
Setup and Registration. Prior to the election the election supervisor announces
the different election authorities, namely the registrar, registration tellers and
tabulation tellers and publishes their respective public keys on the bulletin board.
The registrar publishes the electoral register which contains the identity, the
public registration key, and the public designation key of each voter. Building
upon a homomorphic cryptosystem the tabulation tellers generate an election
key pair in a distributed manner and publish the respective public key pk on the
bulletin board.
For each voter Vi each registration teller j = 1, ..., N generates a creden-
tial share ci,j and publishes its encryption next to the respective voter’s iden-
tity on the bulletin board from which the encryption of the voting credential
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Ei = {ci}pk =
∏N
j=1{ci,j}pk can be computed by multiplying all the individ-
ual credential shares. The shares ci,j in plaintext together with corresponding
designated-verifier correctness proofs are then being forwarded to the voter. Now
the voter can use them to compute their secret voting credential ci =
∏N
i=1 ci,j .
Finally, the encrypted credentials Ei are being shuffled via mix net.
Voting. The voters use anonymous channels for vote casting. As her vote, the
voter casts a tuple
〈Ai = {o}pk, Ci = {ci}pk, σ〉
with o as a chosen voting option and σ as well-formedness proof for Ai and proof
of plaintext knowledge for Ci. The tuple is sent to one of the available ballot boxes
which stores the votes. In case the voter is forced to reveal her credential to a
coercer she can give a fake credential c′ instead while the coercer is not able to
distinguish it from a real one.
Tallying. The votes with invalid proofs are excluded and the plaintext-equivalence
tests are used for identifying the votes with duplicated credentials which are
handled according to the rules concerning vote updating. The remaining tu-
ples 〈Ai, Ci〉 are being shuffled and of votes are being anonymized with mix net
shuffling. Afterwards, plaintext-equivalence tests are applied for checking the va-
lidity of the voting credential by each Ci with each authorized credential from
the shuffled list Ei. For the votes with valid credentials the voting options Ai
are being decrypted.
Security assumptions that JCJ/Civitas relies on:
1. The adversary is not capable of simulating the voters during the registration
process. The adversary is also not present the registration phase.
2. At least one registration teller is trusted and the communication channel
between this teller and the voter is untappable5.
3. The voting client is trusted.
4. At least k out of n tabulation tellers do not fail during decryption.
5. At least n− k + 1 out of n tabulation tellers are trusted not to reveal their
key shares.
6. The channels between voters and voting system used for vote casting are
anonymous.
7. The DDH assumption and the RSA assumption hold an a random oracle is
implemented via cryptographic hash function.
8. At least one ballot box to which the cast votes are submitted is correct.
In addition to the security requirements, it is assumed that the voters are
capable of handling the credentials, e.g. by using some kind of secure credential
management.
5 That is, the adversary is incapable of reading the messages sent over the channel.
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4 Proposed Proxy Voting Scheme
To tailor our JCJ/Civitas extension towards proxy voting we introduce a new
kind of credentials, so called delegation credentials. In addition to a unique voter
credential in JCJ/Civitas, each voter i obtains a list of prioritized delegation
credentials. To delegate a vote with a certain priority j the voter selects the
j-th credential from her list and forwards it to the intended proxy. Voters are al-
lowed to forward different credentials with different priorities to different proxies.
Throughout the tallying phase for each voter only the vote cast with the highest
priority is counted. Due to the fact that delegation credentials are generated on
the same principles as the voting credentials in the original scheme the security
of our extension also relies on the fact that the delegating credentials can be
faked by the voter in case of coercion.
4.1 Necessary Modifications
We describe the modifications to the JCJ/Civitas scheme that are needed for
implementing the delegation while ensuring the requirements listed in Section 2.
Ballot Clustering. Within the JCJ/Civitas scheme coercion-resistance is achieved
by breaking the link between a voter’s identity and votes cast in her name, both
real and fake votes. The introduction of prioritized delegation credentials re-
quires a relation between different credentials being maintained throughout the
vote tallying phase. Retaining such a relation might however cause vulnerabili-
ties with regard to coercion. To address these challenges we build upon proposals
from scientific literature. Spycher et al. [18] present a JCJ extension towards lin-
ear tallying time. Therefore, the authors propose to assign identifiers to cast
(real and fake) votes. During vote tallying after anonymization cast votes are
only compared against the public credential assigned to their respective identi-
fier. This reduces the tallying complexity from quadratic to linear regarding the
number of cast votes. We build upon this approach: votes cast by the voter or
delegated to different proxies share the same identifier such that within the set
of votes sharing the same identifier the vote with the highest priority is tallied.
Delegation Server. Forwarding voting credentials to proxies results in a coercion
vulnerability: The adversary might coerce a proxy to forward all received vot-
ing credentials. In order to test whether the proxy complies the adversary could
anonymously delegate a credential to her and check whether this credential is
being forwarded back to her. We address this problem by introducing a new
entity - possibly implemented in a distributed way - that functions as delega-
tion server (DS). The underlying idea is that proxies do not receive delegated
credentials directly from the voter. Instead the voter blinds her credential and
sends it to the DS (over an anonymous and untappable channel) which forwards
an anonymization of the blinded credential to the proxy. The unblinding value
is sent to the proxy over the private and anonymous channel.
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Inclusion of Linear Encryption. To prevent unauthorized usage of voting creden-
tials the JCJ/Civitas scheme forces the voter to include the plaintext knowledge
proof for the ciphertext encrypting the credential. This solution, however, is in-
applicable to the delegation process since the proxy does not get to know the
value of the credential as outlined above. We address this challenge by publishing
voting credentials (in the registration and voting phases) encrypted with linear
encryption rather than ElGamal encryption. On the other hand for delegating
her vote the voter encrypts their delegating credential with standard ElGamal
using (g2, h) as an encryption key. The resulting tuple {c}pk = (a = gr2, b = chr)
together with other necessary information (see Section 3.2) is being forwarded
to the proxy. If the proxy wants to cast the vote she chooses a random value of
s and computes (gs1, a, bh
s) which is an LE-ElGamal encryption of c with ran-





In this section we provide a detailed description of our proposed scheme.
Preliminary Stage. During this stage the keys used for encrypting votes and/or
credentials are generated. The DS generates ElGamal keys with pkD = (gD, hD)
as public key. The tabulation tellers distributively generate LE-ElGamal keys
pkT = (g1, g2, hT ). We further denote {m}pkT as ElGamal encryption with
(g2, hT ) as corresponding key and {{m}}pkT as LE-ElGamal encryption.
The list of proxies D1, ..., Dd is being made public together with their public
keys used for signing and designated-verifier proofs. For the sake of simplic-
ity we assume that each proxy is eligible to vote herself as well. Furthermore,
anonymous channels that enable communication between the proxies and the
delegation servers as well as between proxies and the rest of the voters are es-
tablished.
Setup Phase. Opposed to the standard JCJ/Civitas scheme, each registration
teller generates T credential shares at random for each voter. Analogously to the
JCJ/Civitas scheme, the encrypted credentials are publicly assigned to the re-
spective voters whereby the order of the credential shares is of central importance
to the delegation process. A public identifier, e.g. the position of the respective
voter in the electoral roll is assigned to each voter. After the setup phase the
bulletin board contains T credentials for every voter V1, ..., Vk (see Table 1) as
well as individual credential shares from each of N registration tellers for each
priority 1, ..., T . We consider the lower number to denote the higher priority.
Registration. The registration phase remains identical to the standard JCJ/
Civitas scheme except the fact that each registration teller releases T ordered
credential shares to the voter. The voter can then verify whether the received
shares from the tellers for a credential c
(j)
i correspond to the encrypted shares
published on the bulletin board near idi and priority j.
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Table 1. Content of the bulletin board after the setup phase of the extended scheme.
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Voting. To cast a vote (without considering delegation) for voting option o voter
i prepares the following tuple:
〈{{idi}}pkT , {{c
(j)
i }}pkT , {{o}}pkT , σ〉
Here σ signifies both the well-formedness proofs for o as well as proof of ran-
domness knowledge for {{c(j)i }}pkT : namely, given {{c
(j)






r1+r2) the voter proves the knowledge of randomness r1 as logg1 c1.
The value of j is chosen depending on the voter’s delegations where we distin-
guish the following cases:
1. If the voter does not intend to delegate her vote at a later point in time she
sets j = 1.
2. If the voter might intend to delegate her vote at a later point in time she sets
j as the lowest available priority: that is j = T in case she did not delegate
any vote yet or j = jd − 1 if jd is the highest priority that was already
delegated.
Additionally, the voter i casts her identifier idi in an encrypted manner which
later serves for clustering ballots from the same voter with different credentials.
Delegating. To delegate her vote with priority j = 2, . . . , T to the proxy Dk the
following protocol (see Figure 1) is executed.
1. The voter i chooses a random value x and sends the following tuple to one




x}pkD , σ, idDk〉
Here c
(j)
i is the j-th credential from her credential list (c
(1)
i , . . . , c
(T )
i ), idi is
the voter’s index, σ is the proof of plaintext knowledge for {(c(j)i )x}pkD and
idDk is the identifier, e.g. the public key, of the chosen proxy. The voter also
sends x, {{idi}}pkT to Dk over a private channel.
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2. The DS computes {(c(j)i )x}pkT from {(c
(j)
i )
x}pkD using proxy reencryption
scheme and a designated-verifier proof using the public designated-verifier
key of Dk that both {(c(j)i )x}pkT and {(c
(j)
i )
x}pkD encrypt the same plain-




the voter’s index {{idi}}pkT are being forwarded to Dk.
3. The proxy Dk verifies the proof and sends the signed value of {(c(j)i )x}pkD
back to the voter as confirmation.6




Fig. 1. Delegation of the voter idi to the proxy Dk, with zero-knowledge proofs omitted.
Casting a delegated vote. To cast a delegated vote for a (unknown) voter X with
(unknown) priority Y the proxy first calculates {{c(Y )X }}pkT . For this - given an
encryption {c(Y )X }pkT = (c1, c2) - she chooses a random value s and computes
{{c(Y )X }}pkT = (gs1, c1, c2hs). Then She encrypts her voting option o and prepares
her ballot according to the voting process outlined above.
Cancelling a delegation. If the voter intends to withdraw one or several vote
delegations (but not excluding delegation in general), she issues the highest
prioritized unused credential, overriding all previously cast votes on her behalf.
Obfuscating the number of cast votes. The fake votes intended to hide the number
of votes cast by a specific voter or her proxy are added accordingly to Spycher et
al.. For each identifier idi the tabulation tellers cast a random number of votes
of the following form:
〈{{idi}}pkT , {{r}}pkT , {{o}}pkT , σ〉
6 This can be done via a two-way anonymous channel or by publishing the signature
on {(c(j)i )
x}pkD on the bulletin board.
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Here r denotes a fake credential randomly drawn for each fake vote, a random
valid voting option o, and the respective zero knowledge proofs σ. The number
of fake votes for each voter is secret and is distributed as outlined in [18].
First anonymization. After all the votes have been cast, votes with invalid proofs
are removed and excluded from further tallying. Thereafter, tuples of the form
〈{{id}}pkT , {{c}}pkT , {{o}}pkT 〉 are anonymized by the application of a mix net.
Ballot clustering. After anonymizing the tuples the values of id are decrypted.
For any index idi appearing within at least one anonymized tuple the respective
ordered list of credentials ({{c(1)1 }}pkT , . . . , {{c
(T )
1 }}pkT ) is obtained from the
bulletin board. All tuples sharing the same idi are clustered. The ordered of
credentials is attached to each cluster, and the value idi is removed from all
tuples.
Second anonymization. All lists of resulting tuples together with the respective
list of attached credentials are anonymized by the application of a mix net. Note
that the order of ciphertexts within the tuples is preserved so that the priority
order of delegation credentials remains intact.
Extracting votes to be counted. In addition to weeding out the votes with invalid
credentials our goal is to tally only the vote with the highest priority in case
delegation took place. In order to do this for any element of the cluster - namely
a list of tuples and public credentials - the list of tuples is matched on the
basis of plaintext equivalence tests (PET) in decreasing order against the list
of public credentials. Starting with the highest priority credential c1 PETs are
executed between all credentials of submitted tuples until a match is found. If a
match is found the value {{o}}pkT is extracted from the matching tuple. Once
the process has been terminated for all tuples a list of encrypted voting options
({{o1}}pkT , . . . , {{on}}pkT ) has been extracted.
Third anonymization and result calculation. The list of encrypted voting op-
tions is anonymized by the application of a mix net. Eventually, the anonymized
encrypted voting options are decrypted and the result is determined.
5 Security of the Proposed Scheme
In this section we consider the security evaluation of our scheme. We first sum-
marize the security assumptions that need to be made, and then provide an
informal security argument regarding the requirements given in Section 2.
5.1 Security Assumptions
We summarize the security assumptions specific to our scheme in the list below:
11
1. More than 2/3 of all tabulation tellers are trusted not to disclose private key
shares to the adversary.
2. At least 1/3 of all tabulation tellers does not fail during decryption.
3. At least one of DS does not fail to forward the delegated votes to the proxy.
4. The DS does not disclose private information to the adversary.
5. The public key infrastructure for the proxies is trustworthy.
6. The private signing and designated-verifier keys of the proxy is not leaked.
7. Communication channels between the voters and the proxies are private.
5.2 Security Evaluation
We hold on to the assumptions of the original scheme which we provide in Sec-
tion 3.2. The security properties of our scheme and the additional assumptions
that are needed for them can then be evaluated as follows:
Vote integrity. The assumptions on integrity for voters remain the same as in
the original scheme.
Availability. The election results can be computed under the assumption that
at least k = 13n tabulation tellers participate in the decryption.
Vote secrecy for voters. The system provides probabilistic coercion resistance, as
there are two scenarios where the coercer can tell whether the voter has obeyed.
The first scenario occurs if the number of fake votes for some voter equals the
known minimal number. The probability of this can be controlled with the choice
of an appropriate distribution function for fake votes. In the second attack, the
coercer requests all the delegation credentials from the voter, and casts a vote
with priority j that is unknown to the voter. In that case, unless there is a vote
cast with the same priority from another voter, the coercer knows whether the
credential given to her was real. The success probability of such an attack can
be reduced with a smaller value of T . For example, with T = 3 the voter can
either vote herself, delegate once or choose one back-up proxy, which we assume
to be sufficient functionality for most of the elections.
Outside of these scenarios, the system provides vote secrecy, and with it coer-
cion resistance for the voters under the same assumptions as the original scheme
with k ≤ 13n. Since the delegating credentials are generated and distributed in
the same way as the voting credentials the voter can cheat the coercer who acts
as a proxy by providing a fake credential instead. Even if the coercer is watching
the voter directly during the delegation, the voter can input a random value as
her delegating credential so that the coercer cannot distinguish it from the real
one.
Delegation integrity. Casting a delegated vote without voter’s permission or a
delegated vote with a higher than given priority would require the knowledge of
the corresponding credential c
(j)
i for the voter i and priority j. Given that each
one of those credentials is generated in the same way as the voter credentials in
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the original scheme it holds that they are not leaked under the same assumptions.
Another way to break the delegation integrity would be to intercept the value
x used for blinding the credential forwarded to the proxy which requires control
over the communication channel between voter and proxy. Furthermore, it must
be assumed that the public key infrastructure for the proxies is trustworthy so
that impersonation of a proxy to a voter is infeasible.
Delegation availability. The proxy receives the credential from the DS accompa-
nied by the designated verifier proof. In case no credential is sent the voter gets
no confirmation and thus is able to repeat the delegation by choosing another
DS. For this it must be assumed that the proxy’s private key is not leaked and
the confirmation cannot be sent by someone else. However, the DS is capable
of submitting an invalid credential if it can fake the designated verifier proof.
Therefore, it must be assumed that the private designated-verifier key of the
proxy is not being leaked.
Vote secrecy for proxies. Given an anonymous channel between the proxies and
the bulletin board the secrecy of votes cast by proxies corresponds to the vote
secrecy for the voters. An additional assumption is required that the DS is not
collaborating with the adversary. In this case using a designated-verifier proof
the proxy can fake the credentials resulting from the delegation process and
present them to the coercer if forced to do so.
Delegation privacy. The proxy could be capable of learning the identity of the
delegating voter in following ways: 1) by identifying the message’s origin via
network, 2) by learning the voter’s ID, 3) by being able to assign the given del-
egating credential to the voter’s identity. The communication channels between
voters and proxies are anonymous, the voter ID is sent encrypted and only de-
crypted after anonymization. The delegating credentials are not otherwise leaked
which is similar to the voter’s credentials in the original scheme. This implies
that the proxy is incapable of determining the identity of voters delegating to
her. In case of a coerced proxy the coercer would not have a possibility of know-
ing whether the credential passed to them is valid and whether the voter has cast
another vote herself. This corresponds with the coercion-resistance properties of
the original scheme.
Delegation unprovability. Given the anonymous communication channels be-
tween the DS and the voters a proxy cannot prove for given credentials that they
come from actual voters and are not simulated by the proxy herself. Moreover,
due to the coercion resistance properties of the original scheme and its creden-
tial generation process the proxy herself cannot verify whether the credential
she received is valid. This implies that the proxy is incapable of constructing a
convincing proof of possessing any amount of delegated votes.
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6 Conclusion
Proxy voting constitutes a new voting mode in which voters are able to delegate
their right to vote on issues beyond their expertise. At the same time, it also
opens new attack vectors as there is a legitimate possibility to transfer a vote to
another person who could be a coercer. To address these issues we created an
Internet proxy voting scheme which focuses on coercion resistance and is based
on the well-known JCJ/Civitas scheme. It provides functionality that enables
vote delegation while at the same time ensuring the security of the delegation.
As our extension introduces additional credentials for delegation, which might
overwhelm voters, an important part of future work would be to improve usabil-
ity of the scheme. In the future, we will consider the proposal by Neumann
and Volkamer [15] to address the credential handling in coercion-resistant proxy
voting.
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